With my day job at SmartData I’ve recently been doing some work for a client, transporting their data from the Microsoft SQL Server that back-ends their desktop application and converting it to a different schema on a different database for a new, web-based application. Because there’s quite a lot of data, the schema are quite different, and the data needs to be converted in a “smart” way: I’ve written a program to help with the task.
Unfortunately, it’s a slow process to move all of the data over. So, to test my program as I continue to develop it, I thought it might be useful if I could take a copy of the “live” database to somewhere more local (like my computer). This would remove the overhead of going through the Internet each time, and reduce the run time of the program significantly – an important consideration during its ongoing development.
Unfortunately, a quirk in the way that Microsoft SQL Server works is that the backup file I can make (ready to restore onto my computer) doesn’t appear on my computer, but appears on the old server. And I don’t have a means to get files off the old server. Or do I? I have a username and password: I wonder if there are any other services running on the server to which I might have access. To find out, I use a program called Nmap to try to get a picture of what services are running on the server.
And that’s when I realised that something might be wrong. For those of you who aren’t inclined toward understanding the ins and outs of network security, the screenshot above should be considered to be more than a little alarming. There’s pretty obvious and clear signs that this computer is infected with Trinoo, NetBus, Back Orifice, and quite probably other malware. It’s almost certainly being used as part of denial of service attacks against other computers, and could well be stealing confidential information from our client’s server and the other computers on their network.
How have things gotten so out of control? I’m not sure. I’ve never seen such a rampant runaway set of infections on a server system before. Computers belonging to individuals, especially individuals inclined to installing BonziBuddy, Smiley Central/Cursor Mania, and so on, are often littered with malware, but one would hope that a server administrator might have a little more wisdom than to let unauthorised code run on a server for which they were responsible. At the very least, a Windows-based, Internet-accessible server ought to be running a strict firewall and antivirus software (virtually all antivirus software would have detected all three of the infections I’ve named above).
Just about anybody can get onto the ‘net, these days, and I can just about forgive a regular Jo who says says, “I don’t know anything about computers; I just want to play FarmVille.” It’s disappointing when they end up inadvertently helping to send email advertising “$oft C1ALIS tabs” to the rest of us, and it’s upsetting when they get their credit card details stolen by a Nigerian, but it’s not so much their fault as the fault of the complexities they’re expected to understand in order to protect their new computer. But when somebody’s running a service (as our client is paying for, from a third-party company who’s “managing” their server for them), I’d really expect better.
The Bit for the “Regular Jo”
And if you are a “regular Jo” on a Windows PC and you care enough to want to check that you’re part of the solution and not part of the problem, then you might be interested in a variety of free, trusted:
- Anti-virus software (essential)
- Adware/spyware removal tools (useful if you routinely install crap downloaded from the web), and
- Firewall software (essential if you connect “directly” to the Internet, rather than via a “router”, or if you’re ever on networks on which you can’t trust the other network users – e.g. free wi-fi access points, shared Internet connections in student houses, etc.)
Edit: And don’t forget to regularly install your Windows Updates. Thanks to Gareth for the reminder that regular Jos should be encouraged to do this, too.
Forcing people to have deliveries sent to their registered address cuts down on card fraud, which is moderately freqent at mail order computer hardware stores on account of the high value, discreetness, and availability of the goods. It’s not possible to accurately perform such checks on credit cards, but it’s easy to with debit cards.
Many banks give special dispensation on their student accounts; allowing them to – for example – submit two addresses which they will automatically switch between throughout the year – or allow two registered addresses to function for card checks (while still delivering the statements to one). Ask your bank if they can do this, and, if they can’t, write a letter to inform them that there are banks that can. If you’re not willing to let your feet do the talking, there’s no way to let these large organisations listen to you.
There’s no reason not to own a credit card unless you feel you cannot trust yourself to do so – or the banks won’t give you one! For many such cards, there is no interest if you pay them off immediately each month (which can be automated thanks to wonderful schemes like Direct Debit): this increases the flexibility of your purchasing power (particularly when purchasing from overseas) without costing you a penny. On a side note, owning one that you only ever use in this fashion increases your credit rating (which is checked when buying a contract mobile phone, getting a mortgage, applying for credit on a car, or whatever). Just for examples’ sake; if you owned an unused credit card, you could have ordered these computer parts and – odds are – immediately transferred the money from the bank account to the card, thereby giving you the bits sooner.
All of that said, I think I’ve quite aptly (and almost entirely) undermined the sense in preventing expensive goods being delivered only to the registered cardholder’s address, because as we’ve just seen there’s always a way to circumvent such checks by routing the money other ways: this leaves a longer paper-trail (banks and credit companies are, by law, required to keep better records for longer than companies that happen to process card transactions), but is otherwise a sensible way to commit fraud without triggering the little alarm bells that debit cards have hanging from them. So yeah; perhaps Scan should be a little less draconian.
Now Chip-And-PIN in the UK: there’s a flawed, insecure, badly-implemented system.