“I Forgot My PIN”: An Epic Tale of Losing $30,000 in Bitcoin

In January 2016, I spent $3,000 to buy 7.4 bitcoins. At the time, it seemed an entirely worthwhile thing to do. I had recently started working as a research director at the Institute for the Future’s Blockchain Futures Lab, and I wanted firsthand experience with bitcoin, a cryptocurrency that uses a blockchain to record transactions on its network. I had no way of knowing that this transaction would lead to a white-knuckle scramble to avoid losing a small fortune…

A hacker stole $31M of Ether – how it happened and what it means for Ethereum

Yesterday, a hacker pulled off the second biggest heist in the history of digital currencies.

Around 12:00 PST, an unknown attacker exploited a critical flaw in the Parity multi-signature wallet on the Ethereum network, draining three massive wallets of over $31,000,000 worth of Ether in a matter of minutes. Given a couple more hours, the hacker could’ve made off with over $180,000,000 from vulnerable wallets.

But someone stopped them…

Hacker figure among code

Password Rules Are Bullshit

Of the many, many, many bad things about passwords, you know what the worst is? Password rules.

Let this pledge be duly noted on the permanent record of the Internet. I don’t know if there’s an afterlife, but I’ll be finding out soon enough, and I plan to go out mad as hell

Let them paste passwords

Anti-copy/paste Javascript code, on a wall.

One of the things people often tweet to us @ncsc are examples of websites which prevent you pasting in a password. Why do websites do this? The debate has raged – with most commentators raging how annoying it is.

So why do organisations do this? Often no reason is given, but when one is, that reason is ‘security’. The NCSC don’t think the reasons add up. We think that stopping password pasting (or SPP) is a bad thing that reduces security. We think customers should be allowed to paste their passwords into forms, and that it improves security…

A Russian Slot Machine Hack Is Costing Casinos Big Time

Slot machine.

In early June 2014, accountants at the Lumiere Place Casino in St. Louis noticed that several of their slot machines had—just for a couple of days—gone haywire. The government-approved software that powers such machines gives the house a fixed mathematical edge, so that casinos can be certain of how much they’ll earn over the long haul—say, 7.129 cents for every dollar played. But on June 2 and 3, a number of Lumiere’s machines had spit out far more money than they’d consumed, despite not awarding any major jackpots, an aberration known in industry parlance as a negative hold. Since code isn’t prone to sudden fits of madness, the only plausible explanation was that someone was cheating…


In common slang, FTW is an acronym “for the win” and while that’s appropriate here, I think a better expansion is “for the world.”

We’re pleased to announce that we have sponsored the development of TLS 1.3 in OpenSSL. As it is one of the most widely-used TLS libraries, it is a good investment for the overall health and security of the Internet, so that everyone is able to deploy TLS 1.3 as soon as possible…

Against DNSSEC

All secure crypto on the Internet assumes that the DNS lookup from names to IP addresses are insecure. Securing those DNS lookups therefore enables no meaningful security. DNSSEC does make some attacks against insecure sites harder. But it doesn’t make those attacks infeasible, so sites still need to adopt secure transports like TLS. With TLS properly configured, DNSSEC adds nothing…

Troy Hunt: HTTPS adoption has reached the tipping point

That’s it – I’m calling it – HTTPS adoption has now reached the moment of critical mass where it’s gathering enough momentum that it will very shortly become “the norm” rather than the exception it so frequently was in the past. In just the last few months, there’s been some really significant things happen that have caused me to make this call, here’s why I think we’re now at that tipping point…

NISTs new password rules what you need to know

It’s no secret. We’re really bad at passwords. Nevertheless, they aren’t going away any time soon.

With so many websites and online applications requiring us to create accounts and think up passwords in a hurry, it’s no wonder so many of us struggle to follow the advice of so-called password security experts.

Stereotypical hacker in a hoodie, from the article.

At the same time, the computing power available for password cracking just gets bigger and bigger.

OK, so I started with the bad news, but this cloud does have a silver lining…

Anatomy of Cookie XSS

A cross-site scripting vulnerability (shortened to XSS, because CSS already means other things) occurs when a website can be tricked into showing a visitor unsafe content that came from another site visitor. Typically when we talk about an XSS attack, we’re talking about tricking a website into sending Javascript code to the user: that Javascript code can then be used to steal cookies and credentials, vandalise content, and more.

Good web developers know to sanitise input – making anything given to their pages by a user safe before ever displaying it on a page – but even the best can forget quite how many things really are “user input”.

"Who Am I?" page provided by University of Oxford IT Services.
This page outputs a variety of your inputs right back at you.

Recently, I reported a vulnerability in a the University of Oxford’s IT Services‘ web pages that’s a great example of this.  The page (which isn’t accessible from the public Internet, and now fixed) is designed to help network users diagnose problems. When you connect to it, it tells you a lot of information about your connection: what browser you’re using, your reverse DNS lookup and IP address, etc.. The developer clearly understood that XSS was a risk, because if you pass a query string to the page, it’s escaped before it’s returned back to you. But unfortunately, the developer didn’t consider the fact that virtually anything given to you by the browser can’t be trusted.

My Perl program, injecting XSS code into the user's cookie and then redirecting them.
To demonstrate this vulnerability, I had the option of writing Perl or Javascript. For some reason, I chose Perl.

In this case, I noticed that the page would output any cookies that you had from the .ox.ac.uk domain, without escaping them. .ox.ac.uk cookies can be manipulated by anybody who has access to write pages on the domain, which – thanks to the users.ox.ac.uk webspace – means any staff or students at the University (or, in an escalation attack, anybody’s who’s already compromised the account of any staff member or student). The attacker can then set up a web page that sets up such a “poisoned” cookie and then redirects the user to the affected page and from there, do whatever they want. In my case, I experimented with showing a fake single sign-on login page, almost indistinguishable from the real thing (it even has a legitimate-looking .ox.ac.uk domain name served over a HTTPS connection, padlock and all). At this stage, a real attacker could use a spear phishing scam to trick users into clicking a link to their page and start stealing credentials.

A fake SSO login page, delivered from a legitimate-looking https URL.
The padlock, the HTTPS url, and the convincing form make this page look legitimate. But it’s actually spoofed.

I’m sure that I didn’t need to explain why XSS vulnerabilities are dangerous. But I wanted to remind you all that truly anything that comes from the user’s web browser, even if you think that you probably put it there yourself, can’t be trusted. When you’re defending against XSS attacks, your aim isn’t just to sanitise obvious user input like GET and POST parameters but also anything that comes from a browser header including cookies and referer headers, especially if your domain name carries websites managed by many different people. In an ideal world, Content Security Policy would mitigate all these kinds of attacks: but in our real world – sanitise those inputs!