That’s it – I’m calling it – HTTPS adoption has now reached the moment of critical mass where it’s gathering enough
momentum that it will very shortly become “the norm” rather than the exception it so frequently was in the past. In just the last few months, there’s been some really significant
things happen that have caused me to make this call, here’s why I think we’re now at that tipping point…
As you may know, I’ve lately found an excuse to play with some new web technologies, and I’ve also taken the opportunity to try to gain a deeper
understanding of some less bleeding-edge technologies that I think have some interesting potential. And so it was that, while I was staffing the Three Rings stall at last week’s NCVO conference, I made use of the
time that the conference delegates were all off listening to a presentation to throw together a tech demo I call Steer!
A player uses their mobile phone to steer a car on a desktop computer, using nothing more than a web browser.
As you can see from the GIF above, Steer! is a driving game. The track and your car are displayed in a web browser on a large screen,
for example a desktop or laptop computer, television, or tablet, and your mobile phone is used to steer the car by tilting it to swerve around a gradually-narrowing weaving road. It’s
pretty fun, but what really makes it interesting to me is the combination of moderately-new technologies I’ve woven together to make it possible, specifically:
The Device Orientation API, which enables a web application to detect the angle at which
you’re holding your mobile phone
Websockets as a mechanism to send that data in near-real-time from the phone to the browser, via a web server: for the
fastest, laziest possible development, I used Firebase for this, but I’m aware that I could probably get better performance by running a
local server on the LAN shared by both devices
The desktop browser does all of the real work: it takes the orientation of the device and uses that, and the car’s current speed, to determine how it’s position changes over the time
that’s elapsed since the screen was last refreshed: we’re aiming for 60 frames a second, of course, but we don’t want the car to travel slower when the game is played on a
slower computer, so we use requestAnimationFrame to get the fastest rate possible and calculate the time between renderings to work out how much of a change has
occurred this ‘tick’. We leave the car’s sprite close to the bottom of the screen at all times but change how much it rotates from side to side, and we use it’s rotated to decide how
much of its motion is lateral versus the amount that’s “along the track”. The latter value determines how much track we move down the screen “behind” it.
The track is generated very simply by the addition of three sine waves of different offset and frequency – a form of very basic procedural generation. Despite the predictability of mathematical curves, this results in a moderately organic-feeling road
because the player only sees a fraction of the resulting curve at any given time: the illustration below shows how these three curves combine to make the resulting road. The difficulty
is ramped up the further the player has travelled by increasing the amplitude of the resulting wave (i.e. making the curves gradually more-agressive) and by making the road itself
gradually narrower. The same mathematics are used to determine whether the car is mostly on the tarmac or mostly on the grass and adjust its maximum speed accordingly.
In order to help provide a visual sense of the player’s speed, I added dashed lines down the road (dividing it into three lanes to begin with and two later on) which zip past the car
and provide a sense of acceleration, deceleration, overall speed, and the impact of turning ‘sideways’ (which of course reduces the forward momentum to nothing).
This isn’t meant to be a finished game: it’s an experimental prototype to help explore some technologies that I’d not had time to look seriously at before now. However, you’re welcome
to take a copy – it’s all open source – and adapt or expand it. Particular ways in which it’d be fun to improve it might include:
Allowing the player more control, e.g. over their accelerator and brakes
Adding hazards (trees, lamp posts, and others cars) which must be avoided
Adding bonuses like speed boosts
Making it challenging, e.g. giving time limits to get through checkpoints
Day and night cycles (with headlights!)
Multiplayer capability, like a real race?
Smarter handling of multiple simultaneous users: right now they’d share control of the car (which is the major reason I haven’t given you a live online version to play
with and you have to download it yourself!), but it’d be better if they could “queue” until it was their turn, or else each play in their own split-screen view or something
Improving the graphics with textures
Increasing the entropy of the curves used to generate the road, and perhaps adding pre-scripted scenery or points of interest on a mathematically-different procedural generation
algorithm
Switching to a local LAN websocket server, allowing better performance than the dog-leg via Firebase
Greater compatibility: I haven’t tried it on an iPhone, but I gather than iOS devices report their orientation differently from Android ones… and I’ve done nothing to try to make
Steer! handle more-unusual screen sizes and shapes
Anything else? (Don’t expect me to have time to enhance it, though: but if you do so, I’d love to hear about it!)
Maybe it’s because I was at Render Conf at the end of last month or perhaps it’s because Three
Rings DevCamp – which always gets me inspired – was earlier this month, but I’ve been particularly excited lately to get the chance to play
with some of the more “cutting edge” (or at least, relatively-new) web technologies that are appearing on the horizon. It feels like the Web is having a bit of a renaissance of
development, spearheaded by the fact that it’s no longer Microsoft that are holding development back (but increasingly Apple) and, perhaps for the first time, the fact that the W3C are
churning out standards “ahead” of where the browser vendors are managing to implement technical features, rather than simply reflecting what’s already happening in the world.
Ben Foxall at Render Conf 2017 discusses the accompanying JSOxford Hackathon. Hey, who’s that near the top-right?
It seems to me that HTML5 may well be the final version of HTML. Rather than making grand new releases to the core technology, we’re now – at last! – in a position where it’s possible
to iteratively add new techniques in a resilient, progressive manner. We don’t need “HTML6” to deliver us any particular new feature, because the modern web is more-modular and
is capable of having additional features bolted on. We’re in a world where browser detection has been replaced
with feature detection, to the extent that you can even do non-hacky feature detection in pure CSS, now, and
this (thanks to the nature of the Web as a loosely-coupled, resilient platform) means that it’s genuinely possible to progressively-enhance
content and get on board with each hot new technology that comes along, if you want, while still delivering content to users on older browsers.
And that’s the dream! A web of progressive-enhancement stays true to Sir Tim’s dream of universal interoperability while still moving forward technologically. I’ve no doubt
that there’ll always be people who want to break the Web – even Google do it, sometimes – with single-page Javascript-only web apps, “app
shell” websites, mobile-only or desktop-only experiences and “apps” that really ought to have been websites (and perhaps PWAs) to begin with… but the fact that the tools to make a genuinely “progressively-enhanced” web, and those tools are
mainstream, is a big deal. If you don’t think we’re at that point yet, I invite you to watch Rachel Andrews‘ fantastic presentation,
“Start Using CSS Grid Layout Today”.
Three Rings’ developers hard at work at this year’s DevCamp.
Some of the things I’ve been playing with recently include:
Intersection Observers
Only really supported in Chrome, but there’s a great polyfill, the Intersection Observer API is one of those technologies that make you say “why didn’t we have that
already?” It’s very simple: all an Intersection Observer does is to provide event hooks for target objects entering or leaving the viewport, without resorting to polling or
hacky code on scroll event captures.
What’s it for? Well the single most-obvious use case is lazy-loading images, a-la Medium or Google
Image Search: delivering users a placeholder image or a low-resolution copy until they scroll far enough for the image to come into view (or almost into view) and then
downloading the full-resolution version and dynamically replacing it. My first foray into Intersection Observers was to take Medium’s approach and then improve it with a Service Worker in order to make it behave nicely even if the user’s Internet connection was unreliable, but
I’ve since applied it to my Reddit browser plugin MegaMegaMonitor: rather than hammering the browser with Javascript the plugin now waits
until relevant content enters the viewport before performing resource-intensive tasks.
Web Workers
I’d briefly played with Service Workers before and indeed we’re adding a Service Worker to the next
version of Three Rings, which, in conjunction with a manifest.json and the service’s
(ongoing) delivery over HTTPS (over H2, where available, since last year), technically makes it a Progressive Web App… and I’ve been
looking for opportunities to make use of Service Workers elsewhere in my work, too… but my first dive in to Web Workers was in introducing one to the next upcoming version of MegaMegaMonitor.
MegaMegaMonitor’s processor-intensive “Lists” feature sees the most benefit from Web Workers
Web Workers add true multithreading to Javascript, and in the case of MegaMegaMonitor this means the possibility of pushing the more-intensive work that the plugin has to do out of the
main thread and into the background, allowing the user to enjoy an uninterrupted browsing experience while the heavy-lifting goes on in the background. Because I don’t control the
domain on which this Web Worker runs (it’s reddit.com, of course!), I’ve also had the opportunity to play with Blobs,
which provided a convenient way for me to inject Worker code onto somebody else’s website from within a userscript. This has also lead me to the discovery that it ought to be possible
to implement userscripts that inject Service Workers onto websites, which could be used to mashup additional functionality into websites far in advance of that which is typically
possible with a userscript… more on that if I get around to implementing such a thing.
Fetch
The final of the new technologies I’ve been playing with this month is the Fetch API. I’m not pulling any punches
when I say that the Fetch API is exactly what XMLHttpRequests should have been from the very beginning. Understanding them properly has finally given me the confidence to stop
using jQuery for the one thing for which I always seemed to have had to depend on it for – that is, simplifying Ajax requests! I mean, look at
this elegant code:
Whether or not you’re a fan of Javascript, you’ve got to admit that that’s infinitely more readable than XMLHttpRequest hackery (at least, without the help of a heavyweight library like
jQuery).
Other things I’ve been up to include Laser Duck Hunt, but that’s another story.
So that’s some of the stuff I’ve been playing with lately: Intersection Observers, Web Workers, Blobs, and the Fetch API. And I feel all full of optimism on behalf of the Web.
Chrome comes with built-in developer tools. This comes with a wide variety of features, such as Elements, Network, and Security. Today, we’ll focus 100% on its JavaScript console.
When I started coding, I only used the JavaScript console for logging values like responses from the server, or the value of variables. But over time, and with the help of tutorials,
I discovered that the console can do way more than I ever imagined…
In the beginning there was NCSA Mosaic, and Mosaic called itself NCSA_Mosaic/2.0 (Windows 3.1), and Mosaic displayed pictures along with text, and there was much rejoicing…
Have you ever wondered why every major web browser identifies itself as “Mozilla”? Wonder no longer…
A cross-site scripting vulnerability (shortened to XSS, because
CSS already means other things) occurs when a website can be tricked into showing a visitor unsafe content that came from another site
visitor. Typically when we talk about an XSS attack, we’re talking about tricking a website into sending Javascript code to the user: that Javascript code can then be used to steal
cookies and credentials, vandalise content, and more.
Good web developers know to sanitise input – making anything given to their pages by a user safe before ever displaying it on a page – but even the best can forget quite how many things
really are “user input”.
This page outputs a variety of your inputs right back at you.
Recently, I reported a vulnerability in a the University of Oxford’s IT Services‘ web pages that’s a great example of this. The page (which
isn’t accessible from the public Internet, and now fixed) is designed to help network users diagnose problems. When you connect to it, it tells you a lot of information about your
connection: what browser you’re using, your reverse DNS lookup and IP address, etc.. The developer clearly understood that XSS was a risk, because if you pass a query string to the
page, it’s escaped before it’s returned back to you. But unfortunately, the developer didn’t consider the fact that virtually anything given to you by the browser can’t be
trusted.
To demonstrate this vulnerability, I had the option of writing Perl or Javascript. For some reason, I chose Perl.
In this case, I noticed that the page would output any cookies that you had from the .ox.ac.uk domain, without escaping them. .ox.ac.uk cookies can be manipulated by anybody
who has access to write pages on the domain, which – thanks to the users.ox.ac.uk webspace – means any staff or students at the University (or, in
an escalation attack, anybody’s who’s already compromised the account of any staff member or student). The attacker can then set up a web page that sets up such a “poisoned” cookie and
then redirects the user to the affected page and from there, do whatever they want. In my case, I experimented with showing a fake single sign-on login page, almost indistinguishable
from the real thing (it even has a legitimate-looking .ox.ac.uk domain name served over a HTTPS connection, padlock and all). At this stage, a real attacker could use a spear phishing scam to trick users into clicking a link to their page and start stealing credentials.
The padlock, the HTTPS url, and the convincing form make this page look legitimate. But it’s actually spoofed.
I’m sure that I didn’t need to explain why XSS vulnerabilities are dangerous. But I wanted to remind you all that truly anything that comes from the user’s web browser, even if
you think that you probably put it there yourself, can’t be trusted. When you’re defending against XSS attacks, your aim isn’t just to sanitise obvious user input like GET and POST
parameters but also anything that comes from a browser header including cookies and referer headers, especially if your domain name carries websites managed by many different people. In
an ideal world, Content Security Policy would mitigate all these kinds of attacks: but in our real world – sanitise
those inputs!
I am increasingly of the opinion that the general software engineering adage “Don’t Repeat Yourself” does not always apply to web development. Also, I found that web development
classes in CS academia are not very realistic. These two problems turn out to have the same root cause: a lack of appreciation of what browsers do…
In 2007 I wrote about using PNGout to produce amazingly small PNG images. I still refer to this topic
frequently, as seven years later, the average PNG I encounter on the Internet is very unlikely to be optimized.
It’s common for a Ruby developer to describe themselves as a Rails developer. It’s also common for someone’s entire Ruby experience to be through Rails. Rails began in 2003 by David
Heinemeier Hansson, quickly becoming the most popular web framework and also serving as an introduction to Ruby for many developers.
Rails is great. I use it every day for my job, it was my introduction to Ruby, and this is the most fun I’ve ever had as a developer. That being said, there are a number of great
framework options out there that aren’t Rails.
This article intends to highlight the differences between Cuba, Sinatra, Padrino, Lotus, and how they compare to or differ from Rails. Let’s have a look at some Non-Rails Frameworks
in Ruby.
Anybody who has, like me, come into contact with the Squiz Matrix CMS for any length of time will
have come across the reasonably easy-to-read but remarkably long CAPTCHA that it
shows. These are especially-noticeable in its administrative interface, where it uses them as an exaggerated and somewhat painful “are you sure?” – restarting the CMS’s internal
crontab manager, for example, requires that the administrator types a massive 25-letter CAPTCHA.
Four long CAPTCHA from the Squiz Matrix CMS.
But there’s another interesting phenomenon that one begins to notice after seeing enough of the back-end CAPTCHA that appear. Strange patterns of letters that appear in sequence
more-often than would be expected by chance. If you’re a fan of wordsearches, take a look at the composite screenshot above: can you find a person’s name in each of the four lines?
Four long CAPTCHA from the Squiz Matrix CMS, with the names Greg, Dom, Blair and Marc highlighted.
There are four names – Greg, Dom, Blair and Marc – which routinely appear in these CAPTCHA.
Blair, being the longest name, was the first that I noticed, and at first I thought that it might represent a fault in the pseudorandom number generation being used that was resulting
in a higher-than-normal frequency of this combination of letters. Another idea I toyed with was that the CAPTCHA text might be being entirely generated from a set of pronounceable
syllables (which is a reasonable way to generate one-time passwords that resist entry errors resulting from reading difficulties: in fact, we do this at Three Rings), in which these four names also appear, but by now I’d have
thought that I’d have noticed this in other patterns, and I hadn’t.
Instead, then, I had to conclude that these names were some variety of Easter Egg.
Smiley decorated eggs. Picture courtesy Kate Ter Haar.
I was curious about where they were coming from, so I searched the source code, but while I found plenty of references to Greg Sherwood, Marc McIntyre, and Blair Robertson. I
couldn’t find Dom, but I’ve since come to discover that he must be Dominic Wong – these four were, according to Greg’s blog – developers with Squiz in the early 2000s, and seemingly saw themselves as a dynamic
foursome responsible for the majority of the CMS’s code (which, if the comment headers are to be believed, remains true).
Greg, Marc, Blair and Dom, as depicted in Greg’s 2007 blog post.
That still didn’t answer for me why searching for their names in the source didn’t find the responsible code. I started digging through the CMS’s source code, where I eventually
found fudge/general/general.inc (a lot of Squiz CMS code is buried in a folder called “fudge”, and web addresses used internally sometimes contain this word, too: I’d like to
believe that it’s being used as a noun and that the developers were just fans of the buttery sweet, but I have a horrible feeling that it was used in its popular verb form). In that file, I found
this function definition:
/**
* Generates a string to be used for a security key
*
* @param int $key_len the length of the random string to display in the image
* @param boolean $include_uppercase include uppercase characters in the generated password
* @param boolean $include_numbers include numbers in the generated password
*
* @return string
* @access public
*/
function generate_security_key($key_len, $include_uppercase = FALSE, $include_numbers = FALSE) {
$k = random_password($key_len, $include_uppercase, $include_numbers);
if ($key_len > 10) {
$gl = Array('YmxhaXI=', 'Z3JlZw==', 'bWFyYw==', 'ZG9t');
$g = base64_decode($gl[rand(0, (count($gl) - 1)) ]);
$pos = rand(1, ($key_len - strlen($g)));
$k = substr($k, 0, $pos) . $g . substr($k, ($pos + strlen($g)));
}
return $k;
} //end generate_security_key()
For the benefit of those of you who don’t speak PHP, especially PHP that’s been made deliberately hard to decipher, here’s what’s happening when “generate_security_key” is being called:
A random password is being generated.
If that password is longer than 10 characters, a random part of it is being replaced with either “blair”, “greg”, “marc”, or “dom”. The reason that you can’t see these words in the
code is that they’re trivially-encoded using a scheme called Base64 – YmxhaXI=, Z3JlZw==, bWFyYw==, and ZG9t are Base64 representations of the four
names.
This seems like a strange choice of Easter Egg: immortalising the names of your developers in CAPTCHA. It seems like a strange choice especially because this somewhat weakens the
(already-weak) CAPTCHA, because an attacking robot can quickly be configured to know that a 11+-letter codeword will always consist of letters and exactly one instance of one of these
four names: in fact, knowing that a CAPTCHA will always contain one of these four and that I can refresh until I get one that I like, I can quickly turn an
11-letter CAPTCHA into a 6-letter one by simply refreshing until I get one with the longest name – Blair – in it!
A lot has been written about how Easter Eggs undermine software security (in exchange for a
small boost to developer morale) – that’s a major part of why Microsoft has banned them from its operating systems (and, for the most part, Apple has too). Given that these
particular CAPTCHA in Squiz CMS are often nothing more than awkward-looking “are you sure?” dialogs, I’m not concerned about the direct security implications, but it does make me worry
a little about the developer culture that produced them.
I know that this Easter Egg might be harmless, but there’s no way for me to know (short of auditing the entire system) what other Easter Eggs might be hiding under the
surface and what they do, especially if the developers have, as in this case, worked to cover their tracks! It’s certainly the kind of thing I’d worry about if I were, I don’t
know, a major government who use Squiz software, especially their cloud-hosted variants which are harder to
effectively audit. Just a thought.
I’m looking for an extension that will automatically redirect-to-HTTPS for particular domains, e.g. to ensure that I’m using the secure version of Wikipedia, etc., whenever I go
there. The HTTPS Everywhere plugin from the EFF does this for Firefox and Chrome; what can I do to make this work in Opera?
As web developers, we’re used to working around the bugs in Microsoft Internet Explorer. The older versions are worst, and I’m certainly glad to not have to write code that
works in Internet Explorer 6 (or, increasingly, Internet Explorer 7) any more: even Microsoft are glad to see Internet Explorer 6 dying out, but even IE8 is pretty ropey too. And despite what Microsoft claim, I’m afraid IE9 isn’t really a “modern” browser either (although it is a huge step forwards over its
predecessors).
But imagine my surprise when I this week found what I suspect might be a previously undiscovered bug in Internet Explorer 8 and below. Surely they’ve all been found (and some of them
even fixed), but now? But no. It takes a very specific set of circumstances for the bug to manifest itself, but it’s not completely unbelievable – I ran into it by accident while
refactoring parts of Three Rings.
A completely useless Internet Explorer error message. Thanks, IE.
Here’s the crux of it: if you’re –
Using Internet Explorer 8 or lower, and
You’re on a HTTPS (secure) website, and
You’re downloding one of a specific set of file types: Bitmap files, for example, are a problem, but JPEG files aren’t (Content-Type: image/bmp), and
The web server indicates that the file you’re downloading should be treated as something to be “saved”, rather than something to be viewed in your browser
(Content-Disposition: attachment), and
The web server passes a particular header to ask that Internet Explorer does not cache a copy of the file (Cache-Control: no-cache),
Then you’ll see a dialog box like the one shown above. Switching any of the prerequisites in that list out makes the problem go away: even switching the header from a strict “no-cache”
to a more-permissive “private” makes all the difference.
I’ve set up a test environment where you can see this for yourself: HTTP version; HTTPS version. The source code of my experiment (PHP) is also available. Of course, if you try it in a functional, normal web browser, it’ll all work fine. But if
you’ve got access to a copy of Internet Explorer 8 on some old Windows XP box somewhere (IE8 is the last version of the browser made available for XP), then try it in that and see for
yourself what a strange error you get.
Opera 12 has been released, and brought with it a handful of new features. But there’s also been a feature removed – a little-known feature that allowed power users to have the
web address appear in the title bar of the browser. I guess that the development team decided that, because the title bar is rarely seen nowadays (the space in which a title once
occupied has for a long while now been used as a tab strip, in the style that Google Chrome and Mozilla Firefox eventually copied), this feature wasn’t needed.
But for users of the KeePass Password Safe, this has the knock-on effect of crippling
the ability for this security tool to automatically type passwords and other form data into web pages, forcing users to take the long-winded route of manually copy-pasting them each
time.
KeePass for Opera Plugin
To fix this problem, I’ve released the KeePass for Opera browser extension. It’s
ludicrously simple: it injects a bit of Javascript (originally by Jean François) into every page you visit, which then appends the URL of the page to the title bar. This allows
KeePass to detect what site you’re on, so the usual Global Auto-Type command (typically Left Ctrl + Alt + A) will work as normal.
[button link=”https://addons.opera.com/en-gb/extensions/details/keepass-auto-type/” align=”right” size=”medium” caption=”KeePass for Opera”]Install[/button]
This blog post is about password security. If you don’t run a website and you just want to know what you should do to protect yourself, jump to the
end.
I’d like to tell you a story about a place called Internetland. Internetland is a little bit like the town or country that you live in, but there’s one really important difference: in
Internetland, everybody is afflicted with an unusual disorder called prosopagnosia, or “face-blindness”. This means that, no matter how hard they try, the inhabitants of Internetland
can’t recognise each other by looking at one another: it’s almost as if everybody was wearing masks, all the time.
Denied the ability to recognise one another on sight, the people of Internetland have to say out loud who they are when they want to be identified. As I’m sure you can imagine, it’d be
very easy for people to pretend to be one another, if they wanted. There are a few different ways that the inhabitants get around that problem, but the most-common way is that people
agree on and remember passwords to show that they really are who they claim to be.
Alice’s Antiques
Alice runs an antiques store in Internetland. She likes to be able to give each customer a personalised service, so she invites her visitors to identify themselves, if they like, when
they come up to the checkout. Having them on file means that she can contact them about special offers that might interest them, and she can keep a record of their address so that the
customer doesn’t have to tell her every time that they want a piece of furniture delivered to their house.
Some of Alice’s Antiques’ antiques.
One day, Bob came by. He found a nice desk and went to the checkout to pay for it.
“Hi,” said Alice, “Have you shopped here before?” Remember that even if he’d visited just yesterday, she wouldn’t remember him, so crippling is her face-blindness.
“No,” replied Bob, “First time.”
“Okay then,” Alice went on, “Would you like to check out ‘as a guest’, or would you like to set up an account so that I’ll remember you next time?”
Bob opted to set up an account: it’d only take a few minutes, Alice promised, and would allow him to check out faster in future. Alice gave Bob a form to fill in:
Bob filled in the form with his name, a password, and his address. He ticked the box to agree that Alice could send him a copy of her catalogue.
Alice took the form and put it into her filing cabinet.
The following week, Bob came by Alice’s Antiques again. When he got to the checkout, Alice again asked him if he’d shopped there before.
“Yes, I’ve been here before,” said Bob, “It’s me: Bob!”
Alice turned to her filing cabinet and pulled out Bob’s file. This might sound like a lot of work, but the people of Internetland are very fast at sorting through filing cabinets, and
can usually find what they’re looking for in less than a second. Alice found Bob’s file and, looking at it, challenged Bob to prove his identity:
“If you’re really Bob – tell me your password!”
“It’s swordfish1,” came the reply.
Alice checked the form and, sure, that was the password that Bob chose when he registered, so now she knew that it really was him. When he asked for a set of
chairs he’d found to be delivered, Alice was able to simply ask, “You want that delivered to 1 Fisherman’s Wharf, right?”, and Bob just nodded. Simple!
Evil Eve
That night, a burglar called Eve broke into Alice’s shop by picking the lock on the door (Alice never left money in the till, so she didn’t think it was worthwhile buying a very good
lock). Creeping through the shadows, Eve opened up the filing cabinet and copied out all of the information on all of the files. Then, she slipped back out, locking the door behind her.
Alice’s shop has CCTV – virtually all shops in Internetland do – but because it wasn’t obvious that there had been a break-in, Alice didn’t bother to check the recording.
Alice has CCTV, but she only checks the recording if it’s obvious that something has happened.
Now Eve has lots of names and passwords, so it’s easy for her to pretend to be other Internetlanders. You see: most people living in Internetland use the same password at most or all of
the places they visit. So Eve can go to any of the other shops that Bob buys from, or the clubs he’s part of, or even to his bank… and they’ll believe that she’s really him.
One of Eve’s favourite tricks is to impersonate her victim and send letters to their friends. Eve might pretend to be Bob, for example, and send a letter to his friend Charlie. The
letter might say that Bob’s short on cash, and ask if Charlie can lend him some: and if Charlie follows the instructions (after all, Charlie trusts Bob!), he’ll end up having his money
stolen by Eve! That dirty little rotter.
So it’s not just Bob who suffers for Alice’s break-in, but Charlie, too.
Bob Thinks He’s Clever
Bob thinks he’s cleverer than most people, though. Rather than use the same password everywhere he goes, he has three different passwords. The first one is his “really secure” one: it’s
a good password, and he’s proud of it. He only uses it when he talks to his bank, the tax man, and his credit card company – the stuff he thinks is really important. Then
he’s got a second password that he uses when he goes shopping, and for the clubs he joins. A third password, which he’s been using for years, he reserves for places that demand that he
chooses a password, but where he doesn’t expect to go back to: sometimes he joins in with Internetland debates and uses this password to identify himself.
Bob’s password list. Don’t tell anybody I showed you it: Bob’ll kill me.
Bob’s approach was cleverer than most of the inhabitants of Internetland, but it wasn’t as clever as he thought. Eve had gotten his medium-security password, and this was enough to
persuade the Post Office to let her read Bob’s mail. Once she was able to do this, she went on to tell Bob’s credit card company that Bob had forgotten his password, so they sent him a
new one… which she was able to read. She was then able to use this new password to tell the credit card company that Bob had moved house, and that he’d lost his card. The credit card
company promptly sent out a new card… to Eve’s address. Now Eve was able to steal all of Bob’s money. “Muhahaha!” chortled Eve, evilly.
But even if Bob hadn’t made the mistake of using his “medium-security” password at the Post Office, Eve could have tried a different approach: Eve would have pretended to be Alice, and
asked Bob for his password. Bob would of course have responded, saying “It’s ‘swordfish1’.”
Then Eve would have done something sneaky: she’d have lied and said that was wrong. Bob would be confused, but he’d probably just think to himself, “Oh, I must have given Alice a
different password.”
“It must be ‘haddock’, then,” Bob would say.
“Nope; wrong again,” Eve would say, all the while pretending to be Alice.
“Surely it’s not ‘h@mm3rHead!’, is it?” Bob would try, one last time. And now Eve would have all of Bob’s passwords, and Bob would just be left confused.
Good Versus Eve
What went wrong in Internetland this week? Well, a few things did:
Alice didn’t look after her filing cabinet
For starters, Alice should have realised that the value of the information in her filing cabinet was worth at least as much as money would be, to the right kind of burglar. It was easy
for her to be complacent, because it wasn’t her identity that was most at risk, but that of her customers. Alice should have planned her security in line with that realisation:
there’s no 100% certain way of stopping Eve from breaking in, but Alice should have done more to make it harder for Eve (a proper lock, and perhaps a separate, second lock on the filing
cabinet), and should have made it so that Eve’s break-in was likely to be noticed (perhaps skimming through the security tapes every morning, or installing motion sensors).
But the bigger mistake that Alice made was that she kept Bob’s password in a format that Eve could read. Alice knew perfectly well that Bob would probably be using the same password in
other places, and so to protect him she ought to have kept his password encrypted in a way that would make it virtually impossible for Eve to read it. This, in combination with an
effort to insist that her customers used good, strong passwords, could have completely foiled Eve’s efforts, even if she had managed to get past the locks and CCTV un-noticed.
Here in the real world: Some of Alice’s mistakes are not too dissimilar to the recently-publicised mistakes made by LinkedIn, eHarmony, and LastFM. While
these three giants did encrypt the passwords of their users, they did so inadequately (using mechanisms not designed for passwords, by using outdated
and insecure mechanisms, and by failing to protect stolen passwords from bulk-decryption). By the way: if you have an account with any
of these providers, you ought to change your password, and also change your password anywhere else that uses the same password… and if this includes your email, change it everywhere
else, too.
Bob should have used different passwords everywhere he went
Good passwords should be long (8 characters should be an absolute minimum, now, and Bob really ought to start leaning towards 12), complex (not based on a word in any dictionary, and
made of a mixture of numbers, letters, and other characters), and not related to you (dates of birth, names of children, and the like are way out). Bob had probably heard
all of that a hundred times.
But good passwords should also be unique. You shouldn’t ever use the same password in two different places. This was Bob’s mistake, and it’s the mistake of almost everybody
else in Internetland, too. What Bob probably didn’t know was that there are tools that could have helped him to have a different password for everybody he talked to, yet still
been easier than remembering the three passwords he already remembered.
Here in the real world: There are some really useful tools to help you, too. Here are some of them:
LastPass helps you generate secure passwords, then stores encrypted versions of them on the Internet so that you can get at them
from anywhere. After a short learning curve, it’s ludicrously easy to use. It’s free for most users, or there are advanced options for paid subscribers.
KeePass does a similar thing, but it’s open source. However, it doesn’t store your encrypted passwords online (which you might
consider to be an advantage), so you have to carry a pen drive around or use a plugin to add this functionality.
SuperGenPass provides a super-lightweight approach to web browser password generation/storing. It’s easy to understand and
makes it simple to generate different passwords for every site you use, without having to remember all of those different passwords!
One approach for folks who like to “roll their own” is simply to put a spreadsheet or a text file into a TrueCrypt (or
similar) encrypted volume, which you can carry around on your pendrive. Just decrypt and read, wherever you are.
Another “manual” approach is simply to use a “master password” everywhere, prefixed or suffixed with a (say) 4-5 character modifier, that you vary from site to site. Keep your
modifiers on a Post-It note in your wallet, and back it up by taking a picture of it with your mobile phone. So maybe your Skype suffix is “8Am2%”, so when you log into Skype you type
in your master password, plus that suffix. Easy enough that you can do it even without a computer, and secure enough for most people.
